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Abstract 
  
Microsimulation models have been used in order to find efficient counteractive instruments to 
poverty. The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of fiscal policy on poverty, insisting 
on child poverty rates. Empirical analysis suggests that in fighting poverty, a mix of policies need 
to be in place, fiscal reforms increasing tax allowances such as child benefit granted to parents 
with dependent children, are not sufficient to reduce child poverty. 
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I.   Introduction 
Unemployment has become an increasing concern, worldwide. High unemployment rates 
do have a negative effect on poverty rates and social inequality, although the relationship is quite 
complex. In the long-run, high persistent unemployment deteriorates human capital and induces 
labour market withdrawal. In the short-run, high unemployment rates put increasing pressure on 
the welfare systems and family dynamics, while insecure labour market conditions induce 
recurrent poverty. 24% of the European Union population is at the risk of poverty, of which 27% 
are children (European Commission, 2013). The most exposed to poverty are children with single 
or unemployed parents. But unlike adults, children experience poverty in a more dramatic 
manner. 
This can be explained by the fact that children depend on their family in terms of income 
provision. Furthermore, poverty may have a vicious aspect such that the children brought up in 
poor families may have difficulties of exiting poverty. Therefore it is important to identify and 
reduce child poverty in the short term. As a further implication, long term poverty can be 
eliminated, or at least significantly reduced. The reduction of child poverty does not have only an 
ethical implication for social policy, but comes actually as an investment with higher future 
benefits for overall society. 
 
In order to reduce child poverty, US, Canada and EU member states have been 
implementing tax reforms, according special attention to child benefits. In US the main 
instrument in assisting poor families is based on Earned Income Tax Credit, while in Canada the 
federal government pays a monthly Child Tax Benefit as well as a quarterly credit to low income 
families and individuals (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002).Within the EU, several types of measures 
have been taken, varying from one country to another. Austria updated family allowances in 
accordance with the number of children, allocating 3% of its GDP towards family and child 
allowance. UK also enacted a series of policy reforms such as: Child benefit increase and 
allocation of a complement for the first child; introduced a Child Tax Credit (means-tested 
benefits for families with children), Work tax credit (means-tested in-work benefit, refund for child-
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care costs) and Housing & Council tax benefits. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are less 
generous in terms of child benefit (OECD, 2013). However, in 2013 the UK has reformed the child 
benefit scheme, withdrawing child benefit from families with one or both higher-rate taxpayer 
parents, in order to cut public spending.  With persistent economic crisis it is likely that child 
poverty will increase in the near future (UNICEF, 2012). 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of tax benefits on reducing 
child poverty. To this purpose, child poverty in Italy is analysed, as it is one of the countries that 
do not allocate many resources in fighting child poverty but it is also by definition a family 
oriented country, among other South European ones. The Italian tax system has as a tax unit 
each individual, therefore couples are taxed separately. With regard to family benefits, the most 
important ones are the family allowances which are means tested, depend on the household 
income and number of components, and are granted to employees and to individuals that receive 
social security benefits (e.g. unemployed).  
There have been three major personal income tax reforms: 2003, 2005, and 2007. In 
2003, the Personal Income Tax Reform started, introduced by the Financial Law which sets a “no 
tax area” that results from the calculation of income related tax allowances, increasing threshold 
levels. This set of new measures leads to tax savings for low/middle income earners. The tax 
credits for dependent family members were maintained. In 2005, family‐related tax credits were 
substituted by deductions (linearly decreasing with income like the no‐tax area deductions) and 
decreased the number of tax brackets, among several other provisions. Under this reform, the 
highest income earners benefitted. Overall, with both reforms tax revenue was estimated to 
decrease by €6 billion each. The 2007 reform targeted a flat-tax plan, but was not completed due 
to extreme revenue-loss fears. Once again, tax deductions have been replaced by tax credits.  
The novelty of the later reform is that it restructured children tax benefits, increasing the 
amount, as before the reform transfers to households with children decreased with income 
inducing high risks of poverty, especially given that there is an increased dependence of children 
on their families, youngsters entering late the labour market. However, over time and three 
reforms, child poverty is approximately at the same rate. In Italy, child poverty was around 16.6% 
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during 1990-2000 period (UNICEF, 2005) and decreased to 15.9% in 2012 (UNICEF, 2012); that is 
it decreased by 0,7% in more than 10 years, which is negligible.  
In this case several questions arise: who are the poor and what is the degree of child 
poverty? What is the effect of child benefit on poverty and what would have happened if child 
benefits would have been doubled with the first reform, is it a sufficient instrument to reduce child 
poverty? In order to answer to these questions, we go back to the first personal income tax 
reform.  
Firstly, we need to identify who are the poor and the incidence of poverty.  
We do this by using a series of computed relative poverty measures such as Head Count 
Ratio, Poverty Gap and Squared Poverty Gap to study poverty and moreover, child poverty.  
Secondly, using microsimulation1, the “what if” question is asked: what would have happened in 
terms of poverty if child benefit would have been not only increased as in the last income tax 
reform, but doubled. After simulating the increase in child benefit, the same poverty indexes are 
applied in order to investigate poverty and more precisely, child poverty. Lastly, the effect of child 
benefit on child poverty is analysed, using Logit and Probit econometric models. 
To sum up, this paper examines poverty and child poverty statistics before and after the 
simulated child benefit increase as well as the effect of child benefit on child poverty, before and 
after simulating the doubling of child benefit. For the remaining sections, the paper is structured 
as follows. In Section II, a review of previous literature is provided, while in Section III the 
theoretical framework and methods of the paper are discussed. Section IV  presents the data 
used and descriptive statistics. Empirical results are reported in Section V, while conclusions are 
presented in Section VI.  
 
                                                            
1 Microsimulation models, by definition, are econometric models using micro data in order to answer a question 
referring to a possible/alternative policy effect. As such it is a simulation of a policy effect, using microeconomic data. 
Therefore the denomination, microsimulation models.  
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II.   Literature review  
In determining child poverty, different approaches have been adopted using several 
measurement instruments as well as data sets. The subject of child poverty has 
multidimensional aspects enclosing factors such as education, child support, health care as well 
as parent employment. Researchers worldwide have been analysing child poverty causes, 
measurements and counteractive instruments. In Italy, Chiara Saraceno (1990) provides a picture 
of child poverty using data from 1950 up to 1990. The main advantage of using data for such a 
long period is that child status as well as child labour can be analysed during social, 
demographic, family structure and economic changes.  
For the 1950-1970 period, there is a marked difference between Northern and Southern 
region in terms of family income and number of children: in the Southern part which was less 
developed, the number of children is higher than in the Northern South which was more 
industrialized. Child mortality rate decreased, which suggested an increase in the family welfare 
and therefore, of children welfare. Kindergarten services as well as schooling process became 
more and more widespread across the country which proved to improve child status. Child labour 
was regulated by a 1967 law, establishing as the minimum working age, 15. However, child 
labour continued to be used traditionally in agriculture or as street sellers. The period 1970-1980 
is characterized by an increasing economic uncertainty, creating regional disparities and 
decreasing fertility rates. In 1978 the National Health Program was introduced, with the aim of 
covering the entire population and as a consequence, infant mortality rate continued to decrease. 
In 1983, the school enrolment rate was of 95%. All in all, in Italy the health care, child-care 
services and educational system has been improving over time. However, the author suggests 
that improvements needed also to be made in terms of child economic protection. 
Wen-Hao Chen and Miles Corak (2006) adopt a more empirical approach as well as a 
wider range of countries in studying child poverty over the 1990s. Their paper employ data form 
the Luxembourg Income Study and perform a cross-country analysis of child poverty. Changes in 
child poverty and public policy impact within 13 OECD member countries, among which Italy was 
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studied. The analysis is based on the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child. The authors 
focus on income poverty analysis, even if the awareness of the multidimensional aspect of child 
poverty exists. The authors considered both fixed and moving poverty lines, computed as 50% of 
the mean and median income, respectively. In the sample, the children are considered to be the 
individuals bellow 18 and child poverty is measured by the Head Count Ratio computed as the 
number of poor children divided by the overall number of children. Three important factors are 
considered: the labour market, family components and public transfers. The main findings are 
that family composition play only a limited role in determining child poverty rates, adult 
employment may or may not decrease child poverty, but increased family support for sure will 
decrease child poverty rate, regardless of its magnitude. In Italy, the child poverty rate is found to 
be above 10% and the parent education and father earnings discrepancies seem to increase the 
child poverty rate. 
A perspective on child poverty regarding Southern European countries as well as a new 
approach in terms of instruments used is offered by Matsaganis, O'Donohue, Levy, Coromaldi, 
Mercader-Prats, Farinha Rodriguez, Toso and Tsakloglou (2004). The novelty of their paper 
consists in applying a EUROMOD microsimulation model to study the effect of family transfers 
on child poverty in countries as Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal. The authors analyse initially the 
distributional impact of family transfers and furthermore the impact of a reform, basically by 
applying the child benefit system existing in countries like UK, Denmark and Sweden. The data 
used vary for each countries and the income has been indexed for 1998. Household 
heterogeneity has been adjusted by using the modified OECD equivalence scale (used by 
EUROSTAT).  
Children are considered to be the individuals below 18 (UNICEF), while poor individuals are 
considered to be the ones with income below 60% of the median per capita equivalent disposable 
income. In order to assess the effectiveness of social policies, microsimulation was used. As 
main findings, the authors underline that the current benefit systems, in the given countries, is 
weak and that the reforms have a positive impact on child poverty, however achievable with 
substantial costs. The policy implications of such simulations are considerable, given the 
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improvements which can be realized if a cost reduction mechanism could be found. 
Focusing on the UK, where the Labour Government set as an important goal the reduction 
of child poverty, Sutherland and Piachaud (2000) apply microsimulation method to assess the 
policies effectiveness. The main approach in combating child poverty is increasing the parent 
employment rate, motivated by the high rates of child poverty in families without paid work. 
Moreover, children tax credit were newly introduced, child benefit and income support (for 
families with children under 11) were increased. Using a POLIMOD microsimulation model, the 
effect of policy changes is analysed. As main result, child poverty considerably decreased. Cross-
country comparison between Austria (“top country for child benefits packages”), Spain (“least 
generous child benefit package”) and UK (in 1999 set as goal “the elimination of child poverty by 
2020”) is performed by Levy, Lietz and Sutherland (2006), in terms of reform measures taken for 
the reduction of child poverty. To this matter, a EUROMOD microsimulation model is applied. The 
question which is asked is what impact would have had the actions taken by one country if they 
would have applied the other two countries systems? The reforms under discussion cover the 
1998-2003 period. As main findings, the child average expenditures has increased in all countries, 
while child poverty rates have been decreasing the most in UK, Austria and lastly, in Spain. 
Generally, the UK reform (means-tested benefits) is the most effective for both the other two 
countries. This approach is relevant and has interesting policy implications, as other countries 
may borrow the “recipe” of fighting child poverty, given that it provides efficient results. 
A broader look at child poverty rates is taken by applying EUROMOD, at the level of 15 
European Union member countries in 2001 (Corak, Lietz, Sutherland 2005). The role of age is 
considered and it is documented that children receive more governmental attention than other 
subgroups in terms of transfers, in most of the countries. Furthermore, children are protected 
from entering poverty by the benefits received: indeed, in countries with higher child benefits, 
child poverty rates are lower. This is obtained surprisingly, by using general benefits and not 
specific measures, targeted towards poor household. 
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III.  Theoretical framework 
This paper contributes to the previous literature and sets as main goal to analyse poverty 
in Italy, insisting moreover on child poverty. In this framework, we want to assess the 
effectiveness of family allowance2 in reducing child poverty. The underlying assumption is that 
transfers made to poor families may reduce either the poverty incidence or poverty depth.  
Precisely we want to investigate if by increasing child allowance, the poverty rate is reduced. 
Therefore we simulate3 the doubling of child allowance and using relative poverty measures, 
firstly we want to identify the extent and incidence of poverty and moreover child poverty before 
and after the simulation. Secondly, using as dependent variable the children living in poor families 
and as independent variable a set of demographic characteristics, Probit and Logit model are 
applied in order to study what is the effect of child benefit on child poverty before and after 
doubling child benefit.  
As a starting point, the net income as well as disposable income for 2004 using 2003 tax 
structure4 is computed. Taxable income is obtained by extracting from the gross income, the no 
tax area deductions. The gross tax is computed according to the tax rates applied to the taxable 
income brackets. The net tax is computed extracting all the family allowances out of the gross 
tax, and finally the net income is obtained by extracting the net tax out of the gross income. The 
disposable income is given by the sum of gross income plus exemptions, evasion and other 
undeclared income. 
In order to identify who are the poor, the concept of poverty line is introduced. We 
consider a fixed poverty line, computed as 60% of the median net income. Households with the 
disposable income below the poverty line are considered to be poor and children living in families 
below the poverty line are considered to be poor. We then apply Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
(1984) index in order to test the sensitivity of the estimates. In this sense, different measures of 
relative poverty are applied such as Head Count Ratio (HCR), Poverty Gap (PGI) and Squared 
                                                            
2 Appendix 1 – Table 2  Initial Child Tax Credit 
3 Appendix 1 – Table 3  Simulated Child Tax Credit  
4 Appendix 1 – Table 1 Tax schedule 
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Poverty Indexes (SPI) firstly on the overall sample, and secondly restricting the sample to children 
living in poor families. 
The Head Count Ratio measures the incidence of poverty, as the proportion of population 
that lives in poverty. Precisely, it measures the percentage of population that has a disposable 
income below the poverty line. The child head count ratio is computed as the percentage of  
children living in families with disposable income below the poverty line, divided by the overall 
children in the sample; we consider all the children in the sample given the high degree of 
attachment of Italian children to the household they were born in. A shortcoming of the HCR 
Index is that it does not measure the degree of poverty, being insensitive to changes in poverty 
severity. In general, it measures how widespread the poverty is and is closely related to the 
Poverty Gap and Squared Poverty Indices. 
The Poverty Gap Index measures how poor the poor are, or poverty depth. It is the mean 
distance separating the population from the poverty line, with the non-poor being given a distance 
of zero. Depending on the specific authority degree of pro-poorness, the budget amounts targeted 
to reduce poverty can be set. In conclusion, the smaller is the poverty gap, the easier it is to 
alleviate poverty by according benefits to the poor. The Squared Poverty Index measures the 
severity of poverty. It actually gives the mean of squared proportionate poverty gap. This index 
puts more weight on the observations below the poverty line. 
 
IV. Data and statistics 
The data set used in the present paper, is provided by the Survey of Italian Households’ 
Income and Wealth 2004 (SHIW) which has been conducted by the Bank of Italy. It encloses 
microdata describing the economic behaviour of Italian households in 2004. A wide range of 
information including personal characteristics of household members are included such as age, 
gender, education, civil status, number of family components, as well as information regarding 
income and labour market status are available, the data set being rich. 
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In the sample there are 20583 observations available of household heads, out of which 
10003 are men, 10578 women; in terms of household components, there are predominant 
families with 3 or 4 members, large families having a small number of observations, which may 
allow for them to be underrepresented. The observations are distributed approximately even 
among different areas, around more or less 20% in each region5, with small differences existing in 
the population density and one exception regarding the Islands (12.7% of population). The data 
set is quite balanced between men and women. In terms of civil status6, the majority of 
individuals are married (51.3%), a large part of the population is single (36.9%), while a smaller 
share of population is either widowed or divorced. Regarding education7, the highest part of 
population has graduated from middle school (28.44%) and only small shares are university 
graduates (6%). Our particular interest regards mostly the children; they represent 31% of the 
entire sample.  
It can be noted that most households do not have children aged more than three8 in their 
composition, and those families who do have children, mostly have only one (24.4% of 
households), or two (20% of households). Not surprisingly, both for children under and above 
three years old, the highest share of one child exists among married couples9, however it is 
unexpected to find that as the number of children increase, they tend to be raised by single 
parents, therefore in the sample existing a large percentage of children living in one parent family. 
Moreover, it can be observed that the highest share of children above three years old live in 
households in which parents have a medium level of education10, while individuals with a short 
university degree or higher education have by far fewer children. For children aged less than 3, 
individuals with no education detain the highest share in the sample. In terms of region11, one 
child families are spread approximately smooth across areas. As the number of children increase, 
the share of families with an increasing number of children increases in the South.  
                                                            
5
 Appendix 1 – Figure 1 Sample distribution, by regions 
6 Appendix 1 – Figure 2 Sample distribution, by civil status 
7
 Appendix 1 – Figure 3 Sample distribution, by education level 
8 Appendix 1 – Figure 4 Sample distribution, by households with children aged more than three  
9 Appendix 1 – Table 4 Children no. distribution, by household, age and parent civil status 
10 Appendix 1–Table 5 Children no. distribution by household and parent education  
11 Appendix 1–Table 6 Children no. distribution by household and  region  
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V.  Simulation results 
 
 
Firstly, the poverty line is obtained as 60% of the median net income. The value of the 
poverty line is set at 4257.7 EUR. Secondly, the HCR index is computed. As main finding, the Head 
Count Ratio indicates that 38.97% of families live below the poverty line. The highest share of 
poor households as well as poor children is registered to be the ones which have 4 members, 
given in Tables 1 and 2. Furthermore, from Tables 3 and 4 it can be observed that the highest 
share of poor households and poor children are located in the Southern part of the country 
(31.01%). Therefore, this may imply the fact that different policies should be adopted according to 
regions to tackle poverty. 
 
 
Table 1. The distribution of poor with respect to the family components number 
 
Poor 
Household Components Number       
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
 
            
0 14.49 30.36 24.41 22.3 6.4 1.62 0.2 0.17 0.05 100 
 
1 0.81 12.85 24.42 39.08 16.4 4.71 0.91 0.54 0.26 100 
 
Total 9.16 23.53 24.41 28.84 10.3 2.83 0.48 0.31 0.13 100 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. The distribution of poor children with respect to the family components number 
 
Poor Household Components Number       
Children 1 2   3    4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
           
0 12 29.67 24.76 23.4  7.57 1.89 0.32 0.29 0.08 100 
1       0   3.72 23.29 46.4 19.12 5.85 0.97 0.37 0.29 100 
Total 9.16   23.53 24.41 28.84 10.3 2.83 0.48 0.31 0.13 100 
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Table 3. The distribution of poor with respect to regions 
 
Poor 
Regions      
 
NW NE Centre South Islands Total 
 
 
      
 
0 25.66 22.18 23.03 18.88 10.25 100 
 
1 18.95 15.54 17.89 31.01 16.59 100 
 
Total 23.04 19.59 21.03 23.61 12.72 100 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The distribution of poor children with respect to regions 
 
Poor Regions      
Children       NW NE Centre South      Islands       Total 
       
0 24.12 20.44 22.13 21.70 11.59 100.00 
1 19.57 16.86 17.46 29.76 16.35 100.00 
Total 23.04 19.59 21.03 23.61 12.72 100.00 
 
However, the Head Count Index represents just one dimension of poverty. Further 
measures are needed in order to build a more complete framework. Using different estimation 
methods, we have obtained robust estimates for Head Count Ratio, Poverty Gap and Squared 
Poverty Gap Index given in Table 5. Before simulating the increase of child benefit, HCR indicate 
that 38.97% poor exist in the sample. The Poverty Gap is of 36.46% and the Squared Poverty Gap 
Index, 35.42%. The PGI could suggest that in order to eradicate poverty, on average transfers 
equal to 36.47% of the poverty line should be given to the poor, which in practice is hard to 
implement due to several reasons, such as additional tax revenues needed and high taxation that 
could suppress economic growth. 
 
Table 5. Poverty Measurement 
Poor -before simulation Poor- after simulation 
 
 The poverty line is set at 4257.7 units 
Headcount ratio %                38.979 38.979 
Poverty gap ratio %              36.463 36.771 
Index FGT(2.0) *100            35.426 36.795 
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After doubling the child benefits, the poverty indices have similar values to those when 
using different estimation procedures: HCR 38.97%, PGI 36.77%, and Squared Poverty Gap 
36.79%. However, comparing the new values with the initial poverty indices it can be noticed that 
in terms of Head Count Ratio nothing changed, but there is a small increase regarding the 
Poverty Gap and Squared Poverty Gap. Therefore, the implication on the overall population of 
doubling of benefits is that the proportion of poor is still the same however poverty depth has 
increased by 0.31% and poverty severity has increased by 1,37%. Once more this indicates that 
benefits should be targeted towards the neediest. However, the easiest way to reduce the 
headcount index would be to target the benefits towards people that are just below the poverty 
line, as are the first to exit poverty and the cheapest to move over the line. There exists also an 
equity-efficiency trade off, as the share of poor individuals just below the line does not represent 
the poorest of the poor. 
 
Table  6.  HCI, PGI, Squared Poverty Gap Index  
Poor -before simulation: Poor- after simulation: 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indices, FGT(a) Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indices, FGT(a) 
All obs a=0 a=1 a=2 All obs a=0 a=1 a=2 
0.38979 0.36463 0.35426 0.38979 0.36771 0.36795 
FGT(0): headcount ratio (proportion poor) FGT(0): headcount ratio (proportion poor) 
FGT(1): average normalized poverty gap FGT(1): average normalized poverty gap 
FGT(2): average squared normalized poverty gap FGT(2): average squared normalized poverty gap 
 
 
Table  7. Robust Standard errors for FGT poverty indices  
Poor- before simulation   Poor-after simulation 
       
Mean Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
p0 .389 .003 .3831245 .3964509 .389 .003 .3831245 .3964509 
p1 .364 .003 .3581992 .3710537 .367 .003 .3611142 .3742967 
p2 .354 .003 .3478895 .3606267 .367 .005 .3575813 .3783245 
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After analysing the degree of poverty in the overall sample, Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
indexes are applied to the restricted sample, composed only of children and young adults living in 
poor families, before and after tax benefit simulated increase (i.e. doubled tax benefit). The 
underlying assumption is that if child benefits are granted to parents in order to reduce child 
poverty, increasing child benefits may help reduce the number of children living in poor families, 
or minimise the poverty depth, i.e. the poor becoming less poor. Table 8  presents Stata output.  
The Head Count Ratio before doubling tax allowances is 76.26%, the Poverty Gap, 74.23% 
and Squared Poverty Gap, 73.50%. In this sample, more than 50% of the children live in poor 
households. Increasing child benefit does not have the desired outcome, the HCR being 
unchanged after doubling child benefit while Poverty Gap is 74.32% and Squared Poverty Gap, 
74.23%.  
 
Table  8. Child Poverty Measurement  
Poor children-before simulation Poor children-after simulation 
  
The poverty line is set at 4257.7 units  
Headcount ratio % 76.269 76.269 
Poverty gap ratio % 74.232 74.324 
Index FGT(2.0) *100                     73.508 74.232 
   
 
 
Therefore, doubling child benefits did not decrease the number of poor children but did 
increase poverty depth among children by 0.9% and poverty severity by 0,73%. The only expected 
outcome that was met was that the fiscal revenues decreased after doubling the child allowance. 
This implies the fact that increasing child benefits is not an efficient instrument, which may be 
partially explained by the fact that by just increasing child benefit, the level of income will also 
increase accordingly for all households.  
Therefore, one suggestion would be to target the needy and grant benefits accordingly. In 
terms of equity-efficiency trade off, this analysis suggests that increasing transfers to poor 
families just below the poverty line may not have the desired effect, the head-count ratio being 
unchanged, and that would be more equitable to grant more transfers to the poorest and 
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decrease the poverty gap.  
Most importantly, these results explain why child poverty has not been decreasing over 
time in Italy. Simply put, because it has not been addressed by proper policies. Targeted benefits 
and regional support could be improved if it is taken in consideration that poverty is predominant 
in the Southern part of the country.  
When trying to answer: what is the effect of tax allowance on child poverty, we apply 
Probit and Logit12 models, presenting robust estimates. Here we do not take into account the 
income, but assume that we can observe only if a child lives in a poor household or not. The 
regressors included in the estimations explain very well the variance of child poverty, as the R 
squared is of 82/83% for the Probit and 83/84% for the Logit model (before/after child benefit 
increase).  
Holding as dependent variable the dummy indicating whether a child is poor or not and as 
regressors a series of dummies regarding demographic and family characteristics, we find that 
both Logit and Probit estimate that the probability for a child to live in a poor household is around 
23%. If child benefit is doubled, when included in the Probit regression we find that there exists a 
slight decrease of a child probability of being poor, of 0.04%.  
As main results, controlling for demographic factors such as age, parents education, civil 
status, education and number of family components, we find that receiving a child benefit, 
positively affects child poverty, statistically significant at 1% significance level; after doubling 
child benefit, the effect decreases. It may be the case that due to very high child poverty, transfers 
needed to alleviate it, needs to be very high as well. 
  
                                                            
12 Annex 2 - Table 1. Child poverty probability: Probit estimates . 
   Annex 2 - Table 2. Child poverty probability: Logit estimates 
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VI. Conclusions 
In the present paper we have tried to establish poverty indices for the Italian population. 
Moreover, we have addressed the effects of tax reforms and doubling the child benefits. Although 
there have been three major tax reforms in Italy, the main change in addressing child poverty, 
from the fiscal point of view was the increase of tax allowances parents receive for their children, 
in 2007. Therefore, this study is useful as it applies a microsimulation model to addresses the 
“what if” question concerning what would have happened if child benefits would have been 
doubled after the first reform. Would have been sufficient to reduce child poverty, given the fact 
that the percentage of poor children has not been changing for the past decade? 
To this purpose a microsimulation model has been used. We conclude that doubling tax 
allowances would not have been enough. On the contrary, although the Head Count Index 
remains the same, Poverty Gap and Squared Poverty Gap Indexes increase.  
Therefore, the overall implication is that poverty depth and poverty severity increases. In 
the entire sample, poverty depth has increased by 0,31% and poverty severity has increased by 
1,37%. Among children, poverty depth has increased by 0,9%, while poverty severity by 0,73%. 
This suggests that the poverty is accentuating, the poor becoming even poorer and it raises an 
equity-efficiency trade-off issue: who should be targeted by the policy-makers? Certainly, the 
most efficient would be to target the poor just below the poverty line, as they are the easiest to 
redeem, but the moral thing to do would be to target the poorest as they face the hardest 
difficulties. However, the later solution would not decrease overall poverty, while the former would 
assuming higher transfers are granted, although may not be equitable.  
Most importantly, these results explain why child poverty has not been decreasing over 
time in Italy. Simply put, because it has not been addressed by proper policies as higher benefits 
are not sufficient to reduce poverty. For example, since most numerous families reside in the 
Southern part of the country, where it is also registered the highest share of poor children, 
regional support could be a good initiative. Furthermore, higher educated individuals have fewer 
children, while individuals with no education or medium education have more children. This may 
Roxana Sandu                  A Microsimulation of the Impact of Tax Reforms on Child Poverty: the Case of Italy 
16 
 
be inversely proportional with the child poverty rate, as a higher educated individual generally 
earn more than an individual which is less educated. This is because a family with less income 
and higher size, it is more likely to be in danger of poverty, rather than a small family with a high 
income. As policy implication, depending on the level of parent education and labour market 
status, training could be provided such that the family earnings increase. Lastly, we also have to 
take into consideration the fact that it may be more difficult for single parents (including divorced 
or widowed) to raise children by themselves, and especially small children, which may enhance 
child poverty: the smaller a child is, the more depends on his parents. Therefore, single parents 
with more or younger children should benefit more from different social policies, such as 
discounted child care or housing services. 
To conclude, poverty in general or child poverty more precisely cannot be reduced only by 
one measure. Increasing child benefits only does not suffice. Ultimately, in order for a social 
planner to successfully in  reducing poverty, several policies must be in place and most 
importantly parents employment status and income support must be ensured. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Tax schedule  
  
Year: 2003                  Bracket (EUR) Tax rate (%) 
Up to 15 000.00 23 
From 15 000.00 up to 29 000.00 29 
From 29 000.00 up to 32 600.00 31 
From 32 600.00 up to 70 000.00 39 
Over 70 000.00 45 
 
 
  
Year: 2005                Bracket (EUR) Tax rate (%) 
Up to 26 000.00 23 
From 26 000.00 up to 33 500.00 33 
From 33 500.00 up to 100 000.00 39 
Over 100 000.00 43 
 
 
 
  
Year: 2007                Bracket (EUR) Tax rate (%) 
Up to 15 000.00 23 
From 15 000.00 up to 28 000.00 27 
From 28 000.00 up to 55 000.00 38 
From 55 000.00 up to 75 000.00 41 
Over 75 000.00 43 
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Table 2. Children tax credit 2003 (for parent with dependent children) 
 
Initial Child Tax Credit Income brackets Amount (EUR) 
 
   
 
Tax allowance for family burdens Up to 36152 516.46 
 
(1 child) 
   
36152-51646 303.68 
 
 Above 51646 285.08 
 
Tax allowance for 1 dependent 36152-51646 303.68+123.95 
 
child(under 3 years old) 
   
Above 51646 285.08+123.95 
 
Tax allowance for 2 dependent Up to 41317 516.46*2 
 
children 
   
41317-51646 303.68+336.73 
 
 Above 51646 285.08+285.08 
 
Tax allowance for 2 dependent 41317-51646 303.68+336.73+123.95 
 
children (1child under 3 years) 
   
Above 51646 285.08+285.08+123.95 
 
Tax allowance for 2 dependent 41317-51646 303.68+336.73+123.95+123.95 
 
children (both under 3 years) 
   
Above 51646 285.08+285.08+123.95+123.95 
 
Tax allowance for 3 dependent Up to 46481 516.46*3 
 
children 
   
46481-51646 303.68+336.73+336.73 
 
 Above 51646 285.08+285.08+285.08 
 
Tax allowance for 3 dependent 46481-51646 303.68+336.73+336.73+123.95 
 
children(1 child under 3 years) 
   
Above 51646 285.08+285.08+285.08+123.95 
 
Tax allowance for 3 dependent 46481-51646 303.68+336.73+336.73+123.95+123.95 
 
children(2 children under 3) 
   
Above 51646 285.08+285.08+285.08+123.95+123.95 
 
Tax allowance for 3 dependent 46481-51646 303.68+336.73+336.73+123.95+123.95+123.95 
 
children(all children under 3) 
   
Above 51646 285.08+285.08+285.08+123.95+123.95+123.95 
 
Tax allowance for children>3 - 516.46*children number 
 
Note:  
-extra-credit for 1 child under 3 of 123.95 EUR is given. 
-for more than 3 children, the tax credit is computed as the number of children*516.46. 
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Table 3. Simulated Children tax credit (for parent with dependent children) 
 
Simulated Child Tax Credit Income brackets Amount (EUR) 
 
   
 
Tax allowance for family burdens Up to 36152 1032.92 
 
(1 child) 
   
36152-51646 607.36 
 
 Above 51646 570.16 
 
Tax allowance for 1 dependent 36152-51646 607.36+247.9 
 
child(under 3 years old) 
   
Above 51646 570.16+247.9 
 
Tax allowance for 2 dependent Up to 41317 1032.92*2 
 
children 
   
41317-51646 607.36+673.46 
 
 Above 51646 570.16+570.16 
 
Tax allowance for 2 dependent 41317-51646 607.36+673.46+247.9 
 
children (1child under 3 years) 
   
Above 51646 570.16+570.16+247.9 
 
Tax allowance for 2 dependent 41317-51646 607.36+673.46+247.9+247.9 
 
children (both under 3 years) 
   
Above 51646 570.16+570.16+247.9+247.9 
 
Tax allowance for 3 dependent Up to 46481 1032.92*3 
 
children 
   
46481-51646 607.36+673.46+673.46 
 
 Above 51646 570.16+570.16+570.16 
 
Tax allowance for 3 dependent 46481-51646 607.36+673.46+673.46+247.9 
 
children(1 child under 3 years) 
   
Above 51646 570.16+570.16+570.16+247.9 
 
Tax allowance for 3 dependent 46481-51646 607.36+673.46+673.46+247.9+247.9 
 
children(2 children under 3) 
   
Above 51646 570.16+570.16+570.16++247.9+247.9 
 
Tax allowance for 3 dependent 46481-51646 607.36+673.46+673.46+247.9+247.9+247.9 
 
children(all children under 3) 
   
Above 51646 570.16+570.16+570.16+247.9+247.9+247.9 
 
Tax allowance for children >3 - 1032.92*children number 
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   Figure 1 Sample distribution, by regions 
 
  Figure 2 Sample distribution, by civil status 
 
   Figure 3 Sample distribution, by education 
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Table 4. Children no. distribution, by household, age and parent civil status 
  
Children>3       Civil status    Children<3 by household   
 
by 
           
Married      Single   Divorced  Widow   Total Married Single Divorced Widow   Total 
 
household 
 
 
50.92 42.14 3.01 3.94 100.00 50.76 48.24 0.60 0.40 100.00 
 
1 
 
2 45.13 51.99 1.21 1.67 100.00 45.45 53.59 0.96 0.00 100.00 
 
3 36.70 61.51 0.57 1.23 100.00 40.00 60.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 
4 30.85 67.73 1.06 0.35 100.00 50.76 48.24 0.60 0.40 100.00 
 
5 28.57 71.43 0.00 0.00 100.00 - - - - - 
 
6 22.22 77.78 0.00 0.00 100.00 - - - - - 
 
7 22.22 77.78 0.00 0.00 100.00 - - - - - 
 
Total 51.30 36.92 3.14 8.62 100.00 51.30 36.92 3.14 8.62 100.00 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Children no. distribution, by household and parent education level 
 
Children Parent Education level       
 
by           
    
High Short 
    
household None 
Elementary      
Middle Professional Bachelor Postgrad. Total 
 
     School   Univ.    
 
 
14.09 15.61 29.92 5.29 26.83 0.82 7.32 0.18 100 
 
1 
 
2 14.1 15.04 33.53 4.14 26.48 0.65 5.96 0.12 100 
 
3 14.72 18.11 36.23 2.74 22.36 0.66 5.19 0.1 100 
 
4 14.89 18.09 41.84 2.13 17.38 0 5.67 0 100 
 
5 14.29 42.86 35.71 0 7.14 0 0 0 100 
 
6 33.33 11.11 55.56 0 0 0 0 0 100 
 
7 22.22 11.11 66.67 0 0 0 0 0 100 
 
Total 12.51 23.79 28.44 5.03 22.97 0.67 6.45 0.14 100 
 
 
Children<3 
Parent Education level 
       
 by           
None Elementary    Middle Professional  High     Short Bachelor    Postgrad. Total 
 
household 
 
      School     Univ.    
 
 
40.61 5.11 23.29 4.45 20.04 0.33 5.97 0.2 100 
 
1 
 
2 52.15 2.87 15.79 5.26 13.88 0.96 9.09 0 100 
 
3 60 13.33 26.67 0 0 0 0 0 100 
 
Total 12.51 23.79 28.44 5.03 22.97 0.67 6.45 0.14 100 
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Table 6. Children no. distribution, by household and region 
  
Children Region      
 
by 
       
North-West North-East Centre      South Islands Total 
 
household 
 
1 24.36 17.7 20.98 23.15 13.81 100 
 
2 17.81 16.16 17.42 31.47 17.15 100 
 
3 11.51 13.68 11.51 42.26 21.04 100 
 
4 15.25 17.02 6.38 47.87 13.48 100 
 
5 0 0 0 50 50 100 
 
6 0 0 0 100 0 100 
 
7 0 100 0 0 0 100 
 
Total 23.04         19.59          21.03        23.61       12.72   100 
 
        
Children       
 
<3 years, Region      
 
by HH       
 
        
1 21.04 19.24 0 0 14.86 100 
 
2 22.49 20.1 18.18 23.44 15.79 100 
 
3 0 33.33 33.33 33.33 0 100 
 
Total 23.04 19.59 21.03 23.61     12.72 100 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Table 1. Child poverty probability: Probit estimates 
 
Probit Robust Estimation Before Simulation Probit Robust Estimation After Simulation  
Poor children Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z  
Age -0.148 .007 0.000 -0.157 .007 0.000  
Age squared 0.001 .000 0.000 0.001 .000 0.000  
Single with >4children -3.057 .333 0.000 -4.015 .356 0.000  
Married with >4children -3.413 .414 0.000 -4.269 .445 0.000  
Child benefit 0.003 .000 0.000 0.001 .000 0.000  
Married -1.607 .188 0.000 -1.361 .209 0.000  
Single 0.773 .171 0.000 1.033 .192 0.000  
Widow -0.507 .371 0.172 -0.671 .426 0.115  
No education -0.358 .556 0.520 -0.430 .535 0.421  
Elementary school 0.475 .553 0.390 0.351 .532 0.509  
Middles school 0.363 .545 0.505 0.297 .522 0.569  
Professional study -0.019 .555 0.971 -0.025 .532 0.961  
High School 0.276 .544 0.612 0.260 .521 0.618  
Short University 0.529 .569 0.352 0.535 .547 0.328  
Bachelor 0.268 .547 0.624 0.283 .524 0.588  
North West 0.134 .065 0.040 0.170 .067 0.011  
Centre 0.119 .065 0.066 0.145 .067 0.032  
South 0.424 .066 0.000 0.394 .068 0.000  
Islands 0.439 .077 0.000 0.411 .080 0.000  
No. family components  2 6.432 .524 0.000 7.067 .544 0.000  
No. family components  3 5.674 .480 0.000 6.571 .516 0.000  
No. family components  4 4.924 .456 0.000 5.771 .495 0.000  
No. family components 5 4.294 .433 0.000 5.051 .474 0.000  
No. family components 6 3.650 .390 0.000 4.348 .424 0.000  
No. family components 7 2.868 .439 0.000 3.443 .468 0.000  
No. family components 8 2.595 .610 0.000 3.303 .647 0.000  
Constant -5.571 .778 0.000 -6.212 .786 0.000  
Probability of a child being poor 23.83 %  Probability of a child being poor  23.79%  
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Table 2. Child poverty probability: Logit estimates 
 
Logit Robust Estimation Before Simulation Logit Robust Estimation After Simulation  
Poor children Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z  
Age -.280 .015 0.000 -0.294 .015 0.000  
Age squared 0.002 .000 0.000 0.002 .000 0.000  
Single with >4children -6.256 .637 0.000 -8.514 .750 0.000  
Married with >4children -6.301 .957 0.000 -8.317 1.089 0.000  
Child benefit 0.006 .000 0.000 0.004 .000 0.000  
Married -3.684 .412 0.000 -3.177 .445 0.000  
Single 1.544 .375 0.000 2.164 .407 0.000  
Widow -1.210 1.06 0.254 -1.685 1.189 0.156  
No education -0.794 .968 0.412 -0.769 .890 0.387  
Elementary school .0626 .955 0.512 0.415 .876 0.636  
Middles school 0.377 .938 0.687 0.310 .854 0.716  
Professional study -0.367 .958 0.702 -0.317 .878 0.717  
High School 0.232 .936 0.804 0.255 .852 0.765  
Short University 0.774 .994 0.436 0.826 .909 0.364  
Bachelor 0.296 .940 0.753 0.3813 .857 0.657  
North West 0.131 .121 0.278 0.184 .125 0.141  
Centre 0.206 .125 0.100 0.228 .130 0.081  
South 0.807 .129 0.000 0.718 .132 0.000  
Islands 0.916 .157 0.000 0.820 .162 0.000  
No. family components  2 14.298 1.011 0.000 15.646 1.08 0.000  
No. family components  3 12.482 .940 0.000 14.446 1.036 0.000  
No. family components  4 10.882 .905 0.000 12.742 1.002 0.000  
No. family components 5 9.396 .876 0.000 11.081 .972 0.000  
No. family components 6 7.915 .782 0.000 9.471 .854 0.000  
No. family components 7 6.183 .786 0.000 7.497 .820 0.000  
No. family components 8 5.613 1.299 0.000 6.992 1.393 0.000  
Constant -12.458 1.454 0.000 -14.08 1.479 
 
0.000  
Probability of a child being poor  23.65 %                                          Probability of a child being poor  23.65% 
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